The court decided that the preliminary hearing judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether the witness should have been allowed to testify in the manner she desired. This meant too that she should have told of her right and afforded the opportunity to consult her own counsel.
The court noted a "quandary faced by the preliminary inquiry judge":
-  . . . Both M---d.S. [the accused] and N.S. [the witness] have powerful claims that seem to lead to diametrically opposed conclusions. At least at first blush, it would appear that the constitutional values in issue collide. Faced with an apparent collision of constitutional values, a court must first attempt to reconcile the rights so that each is given full force and effect within the relevant context..
-  Reconciliation of apparently conflicting rights requires that no Charter right be treated as absolute and that no one right be regarded as inherently superior to another: R. v. Mills,  3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 61; Dagenais, at p. 877; R. v. Crawford,  1 S.C.R. 858, at para. 34. Nor can the reconciliation of competing rights be addressed in the abstract without regard to the specific factual context...
The simple fact is that the mere invocation of the Charter is not necessarily a request for a Charter remedy. In many instances, it is simply a matter of applying Charter principles to the interpretation of a statue or rule and there is no need for special notice to the other party.